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LETTERA 36 OLIVETTI, MACHINE A ECRIRE PORTATIVE ENTIEREMENT ELECTRIQUE 
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SPAIN IN THI COMMON MARKIT? 
In December 1972 Generalissimo Franco is 80. 
Everyone is waiting for what the official press 
prefers to call « the biological event ». 
Behind the scenes, the opposition is marking time, 
having already agreed on a programme for the 
. post-Franco period : re-establishment of political 
parties, the right to form trade unions, freedom for 
the mass media, regionalisation, and amnesty for 
prisoners of the Franco regime. 
For the opposition in Spain today does not stand 
for a popular front, still less for radical or violent 
change. Memories of the civil war are still very 
much alive and it is realised that a popular uprising 
is impossible in the face of a modern army. 
The establishment, well aware that the last of the 
« great » fascists will soon be leaving the scene, 
is distancing itself from him more and more, seek-
ing to establish an alibi which will enable it to go 
on ruling after he has gone. 
The banks, which have always backed 
the regime, are cultivating new men, 
not compromised by their past. The 
big « modern » firms are doing the 
same. Even the former collaborators of 
the regime, now out of power, are 
playing at opposition. Franco's successor, Prince Juan Carlos, 
holds court at Zarzuela with those who 
will be his men when he takes over. 
They are not his friends - they are 
there because that is where the power 
is most likely to lie. 
So today Franco's only ally, and the 
only believer in the future of Franqu-
ism, seems to be Admiral Carrero 
Blanco, backed by part of the army 
and by the Falange. 
I LJ 
The European alibi 
The « opposition » - from the mon-
archist A reilza; a former Ambassador 
to Paris and Washington, to Catholics 
like Ruiz Jimenez, Tierno Ga/van's 
Socialists, and even the Communists 
of Santiago Carillo, - have one thing 
in common : they· are « for Europe ». 
In the present situation in Spain, this 
is an elegant way of being against the 
regime . . For. institutionalised integrat-
ion with the rest of the continent must 
necessarily mean the end of Fascism, 
at least in the forms it takes today ... 
Tactically, the opposition can exploit 
the fact that the European Community 
continues to reserve membership for 
those European countries which have 
similar political structures to its own 
members. But the reality is rather diff-
erent. 
Spain is already effectively a member 
of the capitalist club that is western 
Europe today. It is enough to look at 
the pattern of her foreign trade, the 
flow of investment, the movement of 
migrant workers, the ever-growing 
flood of tourists from the rest of 
Europe, the strategic and military co-
operation with other governments .. . 
European capitalism is the objective 
ally of Franco's regime and its strong-
est support. The continued opposition 
of certain countries to Spanish memb-
ership of the European Community is 
no more than gesture, salving the 
consciences of politicians like Brandt, 
Nenni, Saragat or Mansholt. For none 
of them opposed the conclusion of a 
preferential trading agreement between 
the Community and Spain. 
The big losers in all this are the 
workers. Capitalists from the rest of 
Europe invest in Spain, which is not 
only a tax heaven, but one where work-
ers are badly paid, have no ngnc co 
strike and no real right of collective 
negotiation on wages or working cond-
itions. Because of this exploitation of 
their comrades in Spain , workers in 
the rest of" Europe face having their 
factories shut down for lack of invest-
ment capital or because of low-cost 
competition from plants in Spain . 
Worse still, faced with a strike in a 
democratic country, the multinationals 
can safely switch production to Spain. 
A capitalist bastion 
The process of integrating Spain with 
the rest of the capitalist world, ~md 
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most of all with western Europe, is al-
ready well advanced. This· applies to 
everything from trade to military 
bases . 
According to the figures available the 
biggest single sources of investment 
are the EEC countries (Germany is 
the biggest single investor), Switzer-
land and the United States. It is of 
course impossible to ascertain the real 
origin of the capital. Most of the fig-
ures quoted are misleading, because 
they take account only of the invest-
ment projects that involve acquisition 
of over 50 % of the capital in a given 
firm. This takes no account of the 
possibility of controlling a company by 
holding well under half tbe capital 
and leaving the rest in the hands of 
allies or nominees. 
In trade terms the enlarged European 
Community is far and away the count-
ry's biggest supplier - and custom-
er : around 40 % of Spanish imports 
come from EEC, and nearly half her 
exports are to the nine countries. 
Nearly one million Spanish men and 
women are migrant workers in other . 
western European countries - making 
nearly two million people in all. The 
money they send home - an estimat-
ed 500 million dollars a year in foreign 
currency - plus income from the 
tourist trade is enough to balance out 
the 3,000 million dollar deficit on the 
Spanish balance of trade. 
Though not formally a member of 
NATO, Spain is in reality an integral 
part of the American military alliance 
covering western Europe. Under an 
agreement with the USA dating from 
August 1970, and a defensive pact 
renewed in June 1972, there are four 
major bases in Spain used by US milit-
ary forces. The naval and air base at 
Rota, 11 km. from Cadiz (guarding 
the entrance to the Mediterranean) has 
75 underground fuel storage tanks and 
moorings for giant air-craft carriers, 
and is the only base apart from Holy 
Loch in Scotland that housed Polaris 
submarines equipped with nuclear war-
heads. Twenty kilometres outside Ma-
drid is the Torrejon de Ardoz air 
base. The others are at Saragoza and 
Moron de la Frontiera near Sevilla. 
US military investment in Spain so far 
totals 400 million dollars. 
Into Europe 
All that remains for the regime is to 
institutionalise this state of integration 
with the western militaro-econowic 
complex. The first step came with the 
prefential trade agreement with the 
EEC which came into effect on Oct-
ober I, 1970 - the Dutch having 
abandoned their opposition in order .,. ' 
to win a similar deal for Israel. 
But the new arrangements with th~ ,-
EFT A countries not joining the en-
larged EEC threaten to leave Spain 
as the only western European country 
not to have an industrial free trade 
area with the Community. 
The European Commission has sought 
to remedy this situation, without 
breaching the past refusal of associat-
ion or membership, by proposing an 
overall settlement embracing all the 
Mediterranean area countries (though 
with Spain probably benefitting most) . 
If this comes off - anp negotiations 
on it are due to start early in 1973 -
then Spanish industrialists and foreign 
firms located there will be bound to 
feel the squeeze of tougher industrial 
competition without any say in what 
is happening. In that case they can be 
expected to pressure Franco ( or is 
successor) to move towards democra-
C:Y, as a means of getting Spain acc-
epted as a member of the club. 
The message for socialists and dem-
ocrats in western Europe is that the 
barriers still up against having Fran-
co' s Spain inside the Community are 
vitally important. If there is to be an 
overall Mediterranean pact, hard to 
refuse since Greece, and now Portu-
gal, get industrial free trade, then 
Spain should be told to meet certain 
conditions in order to benefit from it. 
(In this connection, a speech made on 
November 6 in Madrid by Fernandez 
Miranda, secretary-general of the Pa-
lange, is significant : Spain, he said, 
would not accept any conditions : « to 
re-introduce political parties would be 
a fundamentally anti-democratic chan-
ge . .. »). 
But it is when Franco goes that the 
left will have to be most vigilant. 
There is sure to be a wave of pressure 
from conservative and industrial circ-
les inside the Community to take 
whatever slight liberalisation occurs 
then (or even the mere fact of his 
death) as an excuse for taking Spain 
in. 
The left should take its cue from the 
recent statement of the Spanish Comm-
unists (see below) that they want to 
work with those forces whose goal 
is a democratic and socialist Comm-
unity to replace the Community of the 
trusts. 
This would mean debating with the 
\ forces that want a democratic Spain 
- the socialists, communists and 
their allies - what line to take on 
"' _jpanish membership. Spain is not 
· going to change overnight from a 
country where there are no elections, 
no civil liberties, and no trade unions, 
where arbitrary imprisonment and 
torture are the order of the day. Only 
if the democratic forces inside Spain 
are prepared to agree, should the veto 
on Spain in the Market be lifted. 
Until then, the Spanish capitalists and 
the Spanish right should continue to 
be told that the goodies of full mem-
bership will be withheld from them 
until Spain in again a democracy. 
Paolo Giuliani. 
fRANco·s PDWIR STRUCTURI 
The Army 
The army sees itself as the guardian 
of the established order, which it def-
ends and will go on defending at any 
price. 
After Franco dies, it will be the army 
that determines the limits within which 
Juan Carlos can operate, and the polit-
ical choices open to him. The leading 
military figures range from ultra-
Fascists like General lniesta to pseudo-
liberals like General Diez de Alegria. 
But they are all aware that they have 
to remain united if they are to survive 
the shock of the dictator's departure. 
The main components of the army's 
attitude are deep-rooted anti-comm-
unism, fierce hostility to regionalisat-
ion (which in Spanish terms means 
national autonomy for the Basques, 
Catalans and Galicians) and hatred 
of cultural development, which is seen 
as a breeding-ground of revolution. 
This is the kind of law and order 
attitude well calculated to appeal to 
President Nixon and to the CIA : it is 
not for nothing that the Spanish and 
American forces carry out joint exerc-
ises in the Mediterranean area, though 
Spain is not formally part of NATO. 
The army is closely involved in the 
capitalist structure of Spain today -
another element encouraging it to give 
unrestricted support to the regime. 
Several generals on active service are 
even on the boards of the big firms, 
especially state firms or those close to 
the state ; others are « supported » by 
multinational companies. General Ga-
/era is on the board of Tabacalera, the 
state tobacco monopoly, and General 
Lobo on that of the Catalana de Se-
guro (insurance). 
Lower down, the colonels, who did 
not take part themselves in the civil 
war, get their share of the cake too : 
they are allowed to combine their 
military careers with posts in the civil 
administration or in the police. Thus 
Colonel Blanco is also head of the 
security service and a lieutenant col-
onel in the artillery, Lanza, is deputy 
director of the cinema school. .. 
The Secret Police 
The ordinary police is a part of the 
Armed forces and does what it is told. 
Then there is the Social and Political 
Brigade in charge of repression. There 
is another police force, responsible 
directly to Carrero Blanco, the likely 
strong man of the post-Franco period, 
and headed by Colonel San Martin. It 
has its men not only in all opposition 
circles but also in the various minist-
ri~s and regional organisations. At 
first, this secret force was hidden under 
the guise of an export-import agency 
with offices in the Calle Serrano in 
Madrid. But since 1970 it has been 
officially attached to the Vice Pres-
ident's office. Opposition circles conc-
erned at their close contacts with the 
C.I.A., fear a Greek-style coup after 
Franco goes. 
Opus Dei 
« The Work of God » continues to 
furnish the intellectual basis for the 
regime. Totally compromised by its 
thirst for power, this technocratic-
Fascist-religious organisation has for 
a long time now controlled both the 
financial establishment and the gov-
ernment. 
Out of eighteen ministers, 14 belong 
directly or indirectly to Opus De~ : 
they include the minister for f?r~1gn 
affairs ( Lopez Bravo), the mm1ster 
Secretary to the Presidency ( Lopez 
Roda) and the ministers of education 
( Viler Palasi), industry ( Lopez de Le-
tona), trade (Fontana Codina), finan-
ce (Monreal Luque), war (Castanon 
Mena), information (Sanchez Bella), 
the head of the sole trade union (Gar-
cia de[ Ramal) and the Attorney Gen-
eral (Herrero Tejedor). 
Opus Dei has a total of about 20,000 
members, organised according to a 
militaro-ecclesiastical hierarchy. It in-
cludes both priests and Lay people. 
Even high-ranking lay members take 
vows of chastity and often wear a 
cilicio (a metal band with points press-
ing into the flesh, which means perm-
anent self-inflicted pain : women wear 
it on their thighs, men on other parts 
of their body). Opus Dei is a Catholic 
and technocratic elite, with no hold 
over the workers or peasants. It is 
detested by all the democratic forces 
in Spain. Still tied both to Franco's 
regime and to the mediaeval catholic-
ism of the old Spain, it seems destin-
ed to decline in importance. But there 
does exist a so-called « liberal » wing, 
seeking to establish a new image, and 
flirting with the opposition in the hope 
of remaining close to the sources of 
power (the group producing « Ma-
drid », the paper shut down last year 
by the government, belonged to this 
wing of Opus Dei : Calvo Serer, 
Fontan). 
The Falange 
Known as the National Movement, 
this is the sole legally authorised polit-
ical party in Spain. In recent years it 
has turned into a paid bureaucracy. 
It has a lot of members, but most of 
them are civil servants and technocrats 
with no political motivation, member-
ship of the Falange being a condition 
for getting a government job. The on-
ly thing that holds the Falange to-
gether is the administration of power 
at the various levels, right down to 
regional and local goverrunent. 
This pseudo-party, which is supposed 
in theory to run the country, is itself 
run by a National Council with one 
hundred members, meeting behind 
closed doors with Franco present. 
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The leading figures in the Falange are 
Fernandez Miranda (chairman), the 
minister of agriculture Tomas Allende, 
the minister of labour Licinio de la 
Fuente, the speaker of the « Cortes » 
(the pseudo-parliament) Rodriguez de 
Valcarcel, and the president of the 
supreme court, Ruiz Jarabo. 
One wing of the Falange, nevertheless, 
opposes the present regime, which it 
holds to be too closely tied to the 
capitalists. 
The Traditionalists 
This is an ultra-conservative group 
involved with the big farming interests. 
It includes the minister of justice 
Antonio Oriol and the chairman of 
the Council of State, Joaquim Bau. 
The Church 
The Church is a political force, which 
dominates the life of the country and 
will largely determine its future. Signif-
icantly, its role in the present govern-
ment is relatively limited. 
It is only the older bishops, the heirs 
to the old << black » church, who play 
any part, and who support Franco. 
There is one bishop in the Council 
of State, and three others have seats 
in the Cortes. 
The Assembly of Bishops, on the 
other hand, wants a democratic re-
gime. And the younger priests are on 
the side of the forces of the left, 
helping to organise Christian workers 
in close contact with the socialists 
and communists. Not a few of the 
parishes have become veritable train-
ing centres for political militants. The-
re are currently forty priests imprison-
ed in a special « prison for priests » 
at Zamora. 
The economic and financial 
establishment 
Franco and his regime have tradition-
ally been able to rely on the backing 
of the five top Spanish banks (grouped 
in the Consejo Superior Bancario), the 
insurance companies (Sindicato del 
Seguro), the state enterprises (INI) and 
the state oil company (Petrobras). 
The multinational companies, for 
whom Spain is a « tax paradise » as 
well as offering a « peaceful social 
climate » (all strikes illegal, and 
quashed by the police), are raking in 
the profits, and understandably supp-
ort the regime. 
The Spanish banks, on the other hand, 
seem to be changing their tune, as the 
old men at the top are replaced by 
young managers, and in preparation 
for the change that must come, pro-
European attitudes are the order of 
the day. 
Three men 
General Francisco Franco : the man 
responsible for 33 years of ruthless 
repression. 200.000 people have 
died since the end of the civil war, 
tortured to death or executed. Fran-
co continues to govern as he has 
always done, playing off the polit-
ical and economic forces against 
each other. He is suffering from 
arterio-sclerosis and Parkinson's 
disease, and will give up his power 
only when he dies. No-one will in-
herit the power that was France's. 
Admiral Carrero Blanco : Vice-Pres-
ident, a Fascist, a Franquist and a 
soldier. 
Catholics and the technocrats of 
the establishment who are not 
compromised by their relations with 
the regime. If the army will let him, 
it seems he would like to become a 
democratic constitutional monarch. · 
The many faces of the oppositioIJ..._ r 
With the exception of the government 
itself, almost everyone in Spain today 
is playing at opposition to Franco. But 
it does not always mean they want to 
bring about changes in the political, 
economic or social set-up in the count-
ry. 
Precisely because the « opposition >> 
covers the whole political spectrum 
from extreme left to extreme right, it 
is necessary to make a distinction 
between opposition to the present 
governments and opposition to the 
regime itself. 
We shall outline here the various 
trends within this second group, in-
cluding the regional aspect : in Cata-
lonia today there are the beginnings 
of a << national anti-Fascist front », 
the like of which does not yet exist 
elsewhere in Spain. 
PORTRAIT Of THI OPPOSITION 
A devoted and loyal follower of 
Franco, he will ensure the stability 
of the army in the post-Franco 
period. Of limited intellectual abil-
ity, he is at times manipulated by 
Opus Dei, which runs the state for 
him, a task of which he would be 
incapable. His Mazarins are Lopez 
Rado and Lopez Bravo, cynical and 
greedy for power. 
Juan Carlos, Franco's successor : 
Appointed by Franco as his succ-
essor in 1969, Juan Carlos is the 
key to any possible «legal » change. 
Son of the Count of Barcelona, a 
liberal monarchist, Juan Carlos is 
gradually shedding his former image 
as the docile, not-very-intelligent 
puppet whom the army and Opus 
Dei could use at will. He is now 
in regular touch with the non-
Fascist right-wing opposition, the 
This report is based on talks with sev-
eral of the leaders of an opposition 
which is deprived of the right to meet, 
or to express its views, still less to 
discuss its strategy and its goals in 
public. Forms of repression which are 
not · just violent but more and more 
sophisticated prevent the new leaders 
from establishing themselves with pub-
lic opinion, even through clandestine 
meetings. This not only makes imp-
ossible any assessment of the strength 
of support for the various groups ; it 
also means that the names that are 
known to the general public are still 
those of the men who were active 
before or during the civil war. These 
are the rare individuals who have 
survived the blood-bath of the post-
war years, which has never entirely 
ceased in the 35 years that have foll-
owed, adding to the million dead of 
the war years a gruesome toll of 
200,000 people executed (out of 
250,000 condemned by the military 
tribunals), plus a further 500,000 
democrats who fled into exile. 
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It is this policy of cold-blooded ext-
ermination, on a scale amounting to 
--~nocide, coming on top of the mass-
ac·res of the civil war, which explains 
the revulsion from violent change that 
pervades the whole opposition scene. 
But is also that the economic . boom 
of recent years has raised living stand-
ards to a point where the Spaniards, 
whether workers or members of the 
bourgeoisie, react in essentially the 
same way as the vast majority of their 
opposite numbers in the rest of west-
ern Europe, and are not prepared to 
see their standard of living - and 
their lives - endangered by a violent 
revolution. 
Nothing brings this out more clearly 
than the conclusions of the 8th Cong-
ress of the Spanish Communist Party, 
held in October somewhere in Spain 
(neither the date nor the place have 
been disclosed) : the party's top prior-
ity is a return to basic democratic 
liberties. 
The opposition to the 
present government. .. 
The ultras 
The group « Fuerza Nueva », led by 
Blas Pinar. The AUN (Association 
for National Unity) has 500 militant 
members, who maintain links with 
French and Italian neo-Fascist groups. 
They see themselves as defenders of 
the church, and hold commemorative 
services for Hitler and Mussolini. En-
joying government-tolerated immunity 
for their activities, they would be avail-
able to provoke urban fighting to just-
ify the use of the army, if ever there 
were a coup d'etat a la grec<jue. 
Falangisme 
The « progressive » wing of the Falan-
ge consists of the former Youth Front, 
led by Cantarero del Castillo, and the 
« Jose Antonio » political discussion 
circles, under Diego Marques. 
Opus Dei 
A small fraction of the movement 
seeks to build up a « democratic 
right:. (Calvo Serer). 
Franco's former ministers 
Several of them (Frage Iribarue, Jose 
Solis Ruiz ... ) play at opposition to rid 
themselves of the stigma of their past. 
The Monarchists 
A group of liberal monarchists aims 
at « legal » change ( A reilza, Satruste-
gui). 
The Catholic right 
Federico Silva, a former mm1ster 
whom many observers see as likely to 
become the key man with Juan Carlos 
in a period of transition, leads a group 
within the Catholic propaganda organ-
isation (ACNP). 
and the opposition 
to the regime 
The Catholics 
The Catholic opposition is not yet 
openly organised as a new Christian-
Democrat grouping, the Church, it 
seems, having refused to agree to the 
move. But it uses the existing Catholic 
organisations, and does constitute pot-
entially the strongest political force in 
Spain. 
Having marked themselves off from 
Franco and his regime, the progressive 
Catholics are able to keep up excellent 
relations with the communists and soc-
ialists. 
The progressive wing is led by Ruiz 
Jimenez, leading figure behind the 
important political magazine « Quader-
nos para el Dialogo », and the group 
IDE (Spanish Democratic Left). The 
conservative wing centres on Gil 
Robles and his Democratic Social 
Christian group and the CEDA (Span-
ish Conference of the Autonomous 
Right). 
The Catholic left is also partly pres-
ent in the clandestine trade union mov-
ement (UGT) and in the Union Synd-
ical Obrers. Catholics also play an 
important part in grass-roots organ-
isation and active contestation, work-
ing through HOAC - Hermanidades 
Obreras de Action Catolica. 
In both cases the Catholics work hand-
in-hand with the Socialists and Comm-
unists. There is also a revolutionary 
workers' organisation (ORT) which is 
predominantly Catholic. 
The socialists 
The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party 
(PSOE) covers the whole country, and 
is especially wel organised in the 
Basque country and in Barcelona. It 
enjoys the sympathy of many Span-
iards, and would be potentially one 
of the most powerful forces in the 
country in the event of free elections. 
Pablo Castellano, a « young Turk » of 
the generation too young to have 
known the civil war, has been using 
the PSOE a broader base in the coun-
try. 
In Madrid the situation is more comp-
lex, with several dissident trends, 
some following Llopis, others the 
grand old man of Spanish socialism, 
Tierno Galvan. 
The PSOE are very close to the left-
wing catholics, and Castellano and 
Ruiz Jimenez, leader- of the Catholics, 
work effectively together. 
The socialist party makes it· presence 
felt in union affairs through the Gen-
eral Workers' Union, in which it holds 
an absolute majority. 
The Communists 
The traditional Spanish Communists 
are split between two parties : the 
PCE - Partido Comunista de Espa-
na, led by Santiago Carrillo, which is 
independent of Moscow ; and the PC 
(Partido Comunista), of Enrique Lister, 
which maintains allegiance to Moscow. 
The former is far more important. 
Both parties protest their opposition 
to reformism, but will keep their 
forces in hand while awaiting a return 
to democracy in Spain. The field of 
most people in Spain against the very 
word « communist » - for this brings 
with it the threat of remaining out-
lawed even after a change of regime. 
The communis_ts would resort to viol-
ent revolution only as a last resort. 
At its last (clandestine) congress in 
October 1972 the PCE took a stand 
on Europe similar to that of the Italian 
communists : in the event of associat-
ion with EEC, we shall unite our eff-
orts with those of the communists, 
socialists and other forces that are 
seeking to democratise the Community 
and turn the Europe of the trusts into 
a socialist Europe ». 
At the union level, the PCE controls 
the Comisiones Obreras (workers' 
committees) which play a key role in 
the political education and action of 
the grass-roots. 
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The Marxist groups 
There are several active revolutionary 
groups, some using violence. The main 
one is the PCI (International Comm-
unist Party, which is Trotskyist. The 
others are the Marxist-Leninist party, 
the Communist revolutionary league 
(Trotskyist), the FRAP (Anti-Fascist 
and Patriotic Revolutionary Front) 
which follows a pre-Chinese line. 
Other groups 
A Republic Falangist group (FEN) 
A left-wing monarchist group with 
growing influence among the follow-
ers of Don Carlos, a pretender to the 
throne in the nineteenth century. 
and the opposition 
in the regions 
The Basque country 
PNV (Basque nationalist party) -
bourgeois, nationalist, Catholic 
ETA (the prevailing wing of which 
is revolutionary marxist) 
Comunistak (Basque Communist par-
ty) 
Galicia 
Galician Communist party 
Galician Socialist party 
UPG (Union of the Galician people), 
Catholic-inspired 
Catalonia 
This is the only region of Spain where 
the forces of the opposition have link-
ed up in a « national front » - the 
Comisi6n coordinadora de las Fuerzas 
politicas catalana. This includes : 
PSUC (Unified Catalan Commun-
ist party) 
PSOE (Spanish Workers' Social-
ist party) 
UD (Democratic Union), Catholic 
run 
MSC (Catalan socialist movement) 
FRONT, a Liberal group 
la Esquerra Catalana, a bourgeois 
radical movement 
Only the Catalan social-democrats, 
fierc!!ly anti-Communist, say no to any 
coordination. 
lAW AND TDRTURI 
They often say in Spain that there are 
two kinds of people in opposition : 
the torturable and the non-torturable. 
Workers and students come into the 
first category, liable to be tortured, to 
<< disappear H , to lose their jobs or be 
thrown out of the university, with no 
hope of protection or support. The 
opposition among the bourgeoisie, in-
cluding in particular the liberal prof-
essions, is rarely the object of physical 
persecution. 
Judging skilfully when to criticise and 
when to keep quiet, they succeed in 
creating tensions within Franco's re-
gime. They criticise the government's 
economic policy, or its policy towards 
Europe, protest about corruption, and 
make a point of running democratic 
candidates in the elections for posts in 
professional bodies lih' the lawyers' 
associations - the only ones that hold 
democratic elections. Thus the elect-
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i0ns for the guild of Madrid lawyers, 
due to be held in December if the 
government does not ban them, are 
likely to see a challenge to the official 
candidate. That this should be so imp-
ortant is the measure of the total lack 
of political freedom in Spain. 
Jt is sometimes asked why the govern-
ment does not simply impose martial 
law since it does not have to suspend 
constitutional guarantees to act as it 
does. The reason is simple : in 1950, 
as Spain finally emerged from its post-
war period of reprisals and exterminat-
ion, the regime << legalised » the means 
of repression. Physical violence was 
cut back to what was strictly needed, 
and a whole barrage of sophisticated 
legal machinery was set up, making 
it possible to deal with those whom 
the regime sees as a threat either by 
emprisonment or by the more subtle 
tactic of effectively excluding them 
' _ .. 
from the life of the country. For over 
twenty years the hundreds of thous-
ands of politically aware individuals 
who live for the end of the Franco 
regime have had not the slightest 
margin of manreuvre, kept docile b1 
this legal straightjacket. 
The range of instruments which malfu. 
up this « legalised " repression, and 
which can be applied in any comb-
ination, includes : 
• a special « law and order " court 
of five judges, sitting in Madrid but 
competent for the whole of Spain, 
operating under crimi.rial law and 
able to impose vast fines, with pris-
on for those who cannot pay 
• widespread use of legislation on 
public order against political opp-
onents 
• military tribunals, like the notorious 
one that operated in Burgos at the 
end of 1970 
• labour courts that can order the 
sacking of workers from a plant, 
with virtually no right of appeal 
• academic disciplinary tribunals, 
which since the summer of this 
year ( 1972) have begun to demand 
from all students and professors 
a certificate of good conduct issued 
by the police 
• tribunals on « threats to society » 
run by a single judge, empowered 
to rule without trial in cases involv-
ing drugs, young people or workers 
• the special tribunal for the press 
and printing trade. 
After 22 years, the fear of being subj-
ect to the arbitrary « justice » of one 
of these seven courts has become an 
effective deterrent to active opposit-
ion . At the present time there are 1500 
political prisoners in Spain, but an-
other 15 ,000 cases are pending before 
one or other of these special courts. 
Often the court's ruling is intention-
ally delayed, the threat of what it can 
impose being a more effective way of 
neutralising opponents than actually 
sending them to prison. Forms or rep-
ressive action the regime can take 
without sending people to prison in-
clude withdrawal of a driving licence, 
of a passport, or of the permit to 
exercise a particular profession : in 
short, a civil death sentence. 
